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Britain’s Pivot to Asia: 
The Perils & Possibilities of
Post-Brexit Politics
There is a pivot to asia on the horizon, a redeployment of British interest and investment to the Indo-Pacific. For a nation struggling in the darkness of Brexit, global 
engagement of this sort, foreign and economic overtures 
divorced from the European Union, has become the light at the 
end of the tunnel. This much was made clear three months 
ago by foreign secretary Jeremy hunt and defence secretary 
Gavin Williamson in their back-to-back announcements about 
the new opportunity and urgency of engagement in East 
asia.1 Their push needs little elaboration: with many of the 
world’s largest economies, including china in second place 
and Japan in third, as well as many of the world’s fastest 
growing economies, including India in third and Bangladesh in 
fourth, the twenty-first century has accurately been anointed 
the “asian century.” hunt’s op-ed in The Daily Mail, titled “Why 
I am looking east for my vision of post-Brexit prosperity,” 
reflected this fact. It spoke to a classically liberal, positive-
sum assessment of dealing in the global economy—not 
imperial projection but partnership, not gunboat diplomacy but 
deference. It laid bare the fact that Britain, the fifth and falling 
largest economy in the world, needs the powerhouses of East 
asia increasingly more than they need Britain.
Stephen Paduano
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‘Now, as an old 
empire seeks to 
regain its global 
prominence,  
can it find new,  
non-imperial 
ways to do so?
’
That uncharacteristic humility was not, however, shared 
by the defence minister. In an interview with The 
Telegraph the same day, Gavin Williamson announced 
his intentions to return Britain to its status as a “true 
global player,” building military bases across asia and 
offering asian nations what they are allegedly looking 
for from Britain: “the moral leadership, the military 
leadership, and the global leadership.” Last month, 
Williamson doubled down on this pronouncement as 
he called for “enhancing the reach and lethality of our 
forces” in the East by sending the hmS Queen Elizabeth, 
armed with British and American F-35s, to the Pacific.2  
The provocative rhetoric prompted the chinese to 
cancel a trade delegation led by chancellor of the 
Exchequer Philip hammond.3 It was a speech that drew 
accusations abroad of old fashioned imperialism and 
mockery at home for not recognising that Britain is no 
longer what it once was.4
Now, as an old empire seeks to regain its global 
prominence, can it find new, non-imperial ways to 
do so? This is the question that too few people in 
British politics are asking themselves today. With the 
demands of Brexit, the divisions in Parliament, and 
the distractions from both, they can hardly be blamed. 
however, as lawmakers on the left and right agree that 
Britain must look beyond Europe in a post-Brexit world, 
and as the foreign secretary and defence secretary 
signal conflicting pivots to asia, a reckoning with the 
realities and capabilities of Britain’s global engagement 
is long overdue.
In the past half century, Britain has grown into its new 
role of a former power rather uncomfortably. although 
imperialism and revanchism have not been on the 
cards, expressions of them certainly have. It has been 
through the peculiar principles and policies of Britain’s 
Euroscepticism that this attitude—Britain’s sense of 
being apart and above—has become most clear. In 
2016, in a referendum that saw loose talk of returns to 
former glory, delusions of grandeur took centre stage. 
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Now, as Britain formally withdraws from a 
European Union that has been portrayed 
as commercially and geopolitically 
burdensome, the anxious nation will 
finally embark on its long awaited, much 
debated prerogative to act independently 
once more.
Britain has a choice. Will it put a premium 
on commercial relations or geopolitical 
intimidation? Will it seek cooperation 
or confrontation? at present, either is 
possible. The unmooring of the British 
political system, its policies, and its 
principles has put every position, 
no matter the self-evidence of its 
consequences, on the table. But a firm 
reckoning with the realities of both would 
suggest that only the former ought to and 
can be pursued. 
Britain’s pivot to asia, having begun nearly 
a decade ago, in truth has little to do 
with Brexit. It springs not from a sudden 
taking back of control but rather from 
a more deeply held ambition of global 
pre-eminence. The site of this pivot, a 
continent of not only increasing economic 
opportunity but also of increasing 
geopolitical volatility, is a logical 
destination for British dealmakers and 
warships alike. Whether Britain can keep 
up in the region as has been proposed, 
however, is a different matter. Indeed, 
British policymakers should worry for 
reasons of size, signal, and sacrifice. 
The first deficit in Williamson’s hard 
charging proposal is the size of the British 
military. For the past five years, British 
defence spending has remained steady at 
£36 billion per year, a comfortable 2.1% 
of GDP, in keeping with NaTO guidelines.5  
By European standards, that number is 
indeed above and apart— as Germany 
stands at £34 billion, France at £31.5 
billion, and the continent’s smaller powers 
at low double or high single digits.6 But, 
by some irony, it would seem that Britain’s 
Euroscepticism, its feeling of deserving 
a greater role on the global stage than 
what the European Union can offer, has 
been coloured by a hearty amount of 
Eurocentrism. Impressive though the size 
of Britain’s military may be by continental 
standards, by Indo-Pacific standards 
Britain is unequivocally uncompetitive. In 
its pivot east of the Suez and its hopes 
to offer “leadership” in that region, Britain 
will encounter the active presence of 
two adversarial militaries substantially 
larger than its own: russia at £47 billion 
and china at £135 billion.7 moreover, in 
the past half decade china has managed 
to bring as many ships to sea each year 
as the royal Navy has in its entire fleet.8 
What’s more, although Britain’s partners 
in the region—India, Japan, South Korea, 
and, of course, the United States—have 
invited British engagement, their defence 
depth still largely eclipses Britain’s. The 
case of Japan, what is considered to be 
Britain’s natural partner and peer in the 
Pacific, is indicative.9  Where Japan has 
approximately 303,157 active military 
personnel, Britain has a far smaller 
233,000. Where Japan has 131 naval 
assets (aircraft carriers, destroyers, 
submarines, etc.), Britain has 76. and 
where Japan’s aircraft strength totals 
1,572 units (fighter aircrafts, attack 
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aircrafts, combat helicopters, transport 
planes, etc.), Britain’s totals 811. What is 
likely, therefore, is that Britain is putting 
forward redundancies. What is concerning, 
additionally, is that Britain is putting itself 
in harm’s way. Overshadowed by its friends 
and foes alike, Britain is angling to enter a 
space that threatens more calamity than 
many active warzones. considering the 
constrained size of its forces, it is likely not 
a risk worth taking. 
The second problem it faces is one of 
signalling, exacerbating the situation in 
the region by adding to china’s perception 
of a Western alliance of aggressors. The 
past decade has seen a rapid development 
of china’s sphere of influence, not only 
through a redoubling of its hard power 
assets but also through an expansion 
of its soft power presence with the 
Belt and road Initiative. This has come 
with a heightened degree of sensitivity 
towards regional sovereignty as chinese 
tolerance for Western involvement 
within its sphere of influence has quickly 
diminished. confrontational episodes 
in the South china Sea have repeatedly 
put china’s defensiveness on display, as 
seen most recently in the near collision 
of the Luyang destroyer and the USS 
Decatur.10 moreover, one can see the 
aggravation caused by President Obama’s 
“Pivot to asia” in which the United States 
attempted to balance against china’s 
regional hegemony both militarily and 
commercially with increased deployments 
to the region and the construction of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Although 
american attention subsequently returned 
to the middle East and although american 
involvement in the TPP was subsequently 
scuttled, the damage was done. The 
episode entrenched and emboldened 
Xi Jinping and produced new worries 
of a “Thucydides Trap.”11 This concept, 
a history-cum-prophesy conceived by 
Professor Graham allison, breathed 
fear into Sino-american relations as 
it drew on Thucydides’ explanation of 
the Peloponnesian War—“the growth of 
athenian power and the fear that this 
caused in Sparta”—to claim that ruling 
powers, like the United States, will always 
go to war with rising powers, like china. 
although Britain’s likeminded moves 
will produce far fewer disquisitions 
on hegemonic destabilisation, it will 
nonetheless add meaningfully and 
harmfully to a situation that is already out 
of hand. Williamson’s vow that Britain will 
not be a “paper tiger,” his determination to 
“continue to be a lethal fighting force,” his 
insistence that “we shouldn’t be shy about 
the ambition that we have for our forces,” 
and his dead aim at china sent a worrying 
signal to a wary power. In so doing, it 
legitimised not only china’s doubts but 
also its defensiveness—the very policies 
Williamson and the West hope to contain.
The third problem is one of sacrifice 
or, more precisely, consequence 
management. There is not, as there 
once was, a union between military 
and commercial ambitions. Indeed, 
in the twenty-first century the former 
comes increasingly at the expense of 
the latter. This much was made clear in 
the blowback to Williamson’s ill-advised 
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‘In Britain in 2019, 
where the Tory 
Party, the Labour 
Party, and the 
prospects of 
a Withdrawal 
agreement are 
each in free fall, 
there is no ruling 
out the possibility 
that bad policies 
will be taken 
actively or will  
be happened 
upon passively.
’
speech last month. Immediately following the defence 
secretary’s sharp words, china’s Vice Premier hu chunhua 
cancelled trade talks with Britain’s chancellor of the 
Exchequer and ruled out, for now, the possibility of lifting 
chinese import bans on British poultry and cosmetics— 
an untapped market for British exporters that is reported 
to be worth £10 billion over five years.12 But the fallout 
of Williamson’s gunboat giddiness might not stop there. 
With British exports to china totalling £22.3 billion per 
year, there is certainly room for china to impose tariffs 
or further restrictions on key British goods such as cars, 
petrol, and medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
should Williamson plough on with his proposal.13 The 
Trump administration’s trade war with china is indicative 
of the vast scope of potential chinese reprisals, as Xi’s 
government has recently slapped tariffs on $110 billion 
of american goods. although Britain lacks both the bark 
and the bite to ignite a confrontation with china of this 
scale on its own, it is eminently possible that Britain’s 
actions could encourage Trump’s aggravations and that 
the relationship between china and the West could further 
unravel. Should this be the case, the options for china, 
the largest exporter and second largest economy in the 
world, are powerful, multiple, and readily available. as 
Foreign Policy warned last year when china and america’s 
trade war heated up, debilitating measures such as 
retributive tariffs, sanctions, and embargoes may also be 
paired with even more aggressive steps to devalue the 
renminbi.14 The costs of this are clear: not only would a 
slide in the Renminbi destabilise global financial markets, 
as was most recently the case in 2015, it would also 
make non-chinese exporters less competitive. In such 
an event, Britain would find itself in an economically 
suffocating double bind, caught between old headwinds 
in the West and new headwinds in the East. First, as the 
pound has continued to slip against the euro since the 
Brexit referendum, imports from the EU—Britain’s largest 
trading partner—have become more expensive. This has 
and is expected to continue to place strains on the British 
economy as the cost of living in the United Kingdom 
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rises.15 Second, just as Britain grapples with the 
problems of a weak pound, the spectre of confrontation 
and the threat of currency devaluation would likely place 
significant deflationary pressure on Britain in particular, 
where inflation is already at a two-year low, and in the 
global economy more broadly.16 as the Bank of England 
repeatedly revises growth forecasts downward, the 
grave economic sacrifice that comes with “enhancing 
reach and lethality” is a sacrifice Britain cannot afford  
to make.
In Britain in 2019, where the Tory Party, the Labour 
Party, and the prospects of a Withdrawal agreement are 
each in free fall, there is no ruling out the possibility that 
bad policies will be taken actively or will be happened 
upon passively. Nor is there any denying that Brexiteers 
may continue to fan the flames of British jingoism and 
encourage inadvisable commercial and military activity 
in and towards the Indo-Pacific. But the record should 
nevertheless show that proceeding with Williamson’s 
proposal, his insistence that Britain not “be shy about 
the ambition that we have for our forces,” would make 
Britain, its military, and its economy less secure.
To be fair, one should not paint Britain’s global ambitions 
as exclusively hawkish, conceited, and Williamsonian. 
Indeed, the billions that Britain has expended on disaster 
relief operations across the world, and in particular 
in East asia, point to a promising alternative path 
for British Indo-Pacific engagement.17  So too does 
the recent role which Britain has adopted to mediate 
between china and the United States in the on-going 
huawei crisis.18 and, of course, there are the non-
confrontational opportunities for global engagement 
made clear in Jeremy hunt’s trade-oriented campaign. 
as a P5 nation, Britain, like France, will likely always 
consider itself a great power long after its greatness 
and power have been eclipsed. It is important to note, 
however, that greatness and power needn’t be military. 
There is certainly a role for Britain in the twenty-first 
century, the “asian century,” and there is room for 
‘There is certainly 
a role for Britain 
in the twenty-first 
century, the  
“asian century,” 
and there is room 
for Britain to 
prosper on the 
global stage. But 
for this to be the 
case, cooperation,  
not confrontation, 
is its path forward. 
’
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Britain to prosper on the global stage.19 
But for this to be the case, cooperation, not 
confrontation, is its path forward. 
What might this cooperation look 
like? Where might it begin? Success in 
the Indo-Pacific, as its hyphen suggests, 
must be two-pronged: there must be a 
policy both for the Indo and the Pacific. 
At present, it is the Pacific which causes 
the most distress. a recent overture by 
the Japanese Prime minister Shinzo abe 
inviting the United Kingdom to join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, an eleven-nation 
trade agreement which saliently does 
not include china, was welcomed as a 
promising route to Pacific engagement, but 
in truth it offered little to bolster Britain’s 
ambitions in the region. If Britain’s bid to 
join is accepted by the TPP’s members, 
which, given the nation’s paltry claim 
to a presence in the Pacific of a few 
contested colonies, is no guarantee, the 
matter of chinese engagement will still 
be unresolved. Looking for ways to build 
trust with china, a necessary condition 
to building a presence in its region, will 
require a continued and concerted effort. 
mediating between conflicting chinese and 
american interests, as the United Kingdom 
has evidenced a capacity to do in the 
huawei affair, is a healthy place to start. 
Doubling down on participation in china’s 
asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a 
soft-power vehicle that funds infrastructure 
projects in the chinese periphery, a 
worthwhile if instrumental objective, may 
be an economically and diplomatically 
valuable opportunity for British involvement 
too. above all, muzzling the grandstanding 
and hostility that force china to walk away 
from trade talks will be a priority. 
On the Indo side of the hyphen, where there 
is only one familiar power to court, areas 
for partnership are substantially more 
available and actionable. The precedent 
for India-UK relations, the Defence & 
International Security Partnership signed 
in 2015 along with Indian purchases of 
formerly British carriers and aircrafts, 
is also reassuring.20 Five new potential 
policies now present themselves. 
First and foremost, there is the opportunity 
for British and Indian cooperation in the 
Gulf as Prime minister Narendra modi’s 
new agenda for the Indo-Pacific will require 
partnerships oriented towards defence and 
security in that contentious area.21 While 
India already benefits from advanced trade 
relations with oil producers in the Gulf, its 
military partnerships are lagging. Given  
the presence and experience of Britain’s 
armed forces in Bahrain and elsewhere, 
a UK-India partnership could yield 
meaningful results in joint anti-piracy 
efforts, counter-terrorism training, and 
counter-extremism programmes. 
Secondly, there is the opportunity for 
British and Indian burden sharing on 
maritime Domain awareness (mDa) in  
the Indian Ocean. mDa refers to managing 
the broad spectrum of strategic concerns 
—security, economic, and environmental— 
lying in and emanating from the maritime 
domain. The urgency of redoubling India’s 
mDa has been put on display in the past 
decade by porous shores, piracy, and a 
rise in natural disasters. Given the growing 
LSE IDEAS STrATEgIc UPDATE   |   March 2019 BrITAIn’S PIvoT To ASIA: ThE PErILS & PoSSIBILITIES of PoST-BrExIT PoLITIcS     |   Stephen Paduano 
 
10 11
consequence of the region, mDa burden sharing is 
a policy that should have been pursued long before 
Britain’s post-Brexit pivot. as modi attempts to 
reallocate Indian attention to its maritime borders, and 
as his government builds regional partnerships to do 
so, a helping hand from Britain would likely  
be welcomed.22 
Third, Britain can facilitate the development of 
India’s “Blue Economy,” the commercial activities and 
regulations around its ocean’s ecosystem. a Blue 
Economy is a fledgling concept, but its commitment 
to sustainability and growth has made it particularly 
attractive to a nation in the throes of an environmental 
crisis and an economic slowdown.23 It is also a 
particular speciality of Britain, a former thalassocracy 
with an intimate understanding of the world’s oceans, 
a highly developed regulatory landscape, and an 
advanced industrial economy. Where Indian experts 
have noted a lack of Indian engagement with the idea 
of a Blue Economy, British experts, commissioned 
by the British government, have developed a robust 
policy framework for approaching the issue.24 This 
framework, published in a report titled Foresight 
Future of the Sea, encompasses strategic planning 
in the Indian Ocean and sets agenda items for areas 
of collaboration.25 There are few issues with as much 
mutual and actionable interest as the Blue Economy.
The fourth potential point of collaboration builds on 
the prior two opportunities for coordination on the 
seas. It also builds on the first opportunity for joint 
military engagement. This would come in the form 
of a “logistics exchange agreement,” a soporific 
yet substantial way to strengthen ties and extend 
capabilities in certain areas of interest. Such an 
agreement would follow the one formed between India 
and the United States three years ago, which gave both 
nations access to each other’s facilities for refuelling 
and replenishing, as well as joint exercises, training, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.26 In the 
‘Possible 
opportunities for 
engagement are  
in a constant  
state of evolution 
and, at present, 
certain measures  
in the Indo-Pacific 
are simply not  
available to  
the British 
government.
’
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long run, such an agreement serves a deeper purpose, as 
ankit Panda has noted in The Diplomat: to “grease the  
wheels on the bureaucracy underlying defence 
collaboration.”27 That is to say, a logistics exchange 
agreement today will help set the groundwork for far more 
meaningful coordination tomorrow.
The fifth and final recommendation would equally promote 
long-term collaboration and would be equally, admittedly, 
dull: discussion forums. In recent years, India has stepped 
up efforts to construct “maritime Security Dialogues” with 
many partners in the region, including the United States, 
china, australia, France and more. While Britain’s maritime 
partnership with India, in certain respects, is stronger than 
those of India’s dialogue partners, the UK-India relationship 
would certainly benefit from continuous and committed 
forums to discuss strategic maritime interests. an open 
maritime Security Dialogue would meaningfully help  
this cause.
To some degree, these policy recommendations are 
provisionally incomplete and necessarily so. Possible 
opportunities for engagement are in a constant state of 
evolution and, at present, certain measures in the Indo-
Pacific are simply not available to the British government. 
at the same time, the options that are available in Britain’s 
relationship with India cannot be pursued too quickly lest 
china grow more concerned and more defensive. Developing 
mutual trust, serving mutual interests, and reshaping Britain’s 
relations in the East to mirror its relations in the West will 
take years of patience and partnership— virtues heretofore 
undervalued in Britain’s non-Western foreign policy—rather 
than the sort of power projection that policymakers like 
Gavin Williamson have promoted. Yet it is important to 
know, as this Strategic Update has endeavoured to show, 
that productive policies do exist. at the same time, this 
Strategic Update has argued that certain unproductive and 
self-destructive policies exist too. The ability to discriminate 
between the two, to prioritise common ground over scorched 
earth, will be the deciding factor in the future of Britain’s 
global engagement.  
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